IR Policy Task Force

Overview
USAID’s retreat represents a decisive rupture in U.S. foreign policy by removing a critical
instrument of American soft power at a moment of instability. This paper examined how the
withdrawal reshaped U.S. geopolitical influence in Southeast Asia and iterated the consequences
that extend beyond the loss of humanitarian capacity. USAID had served for over a decade as the
United States’ main mechanism for engaging with Myanmar’s population, supporting civil
society, enabling independent media, and funding public health systems, all while facilitating the
country's path towards democratization.

Recommendation #1
The consequences of dismantling USAID’s operations in Myanmar highlight a broad structural
issue in U.S. foreign policy. To prevent future geopolitical vacuums, creating insulated, longterm
funding mechanisms would enhance U.S. credibility. This includes statutory protections
that prevent abrupt termination of major overseas missions. Legislation that designates core
USAID functions, such as humanitarian pipelines and country-specific missions, as
congressionally mandated would require legislative approval rather than executive discretion
alone to suspend or dissolve them. Such protections would ensure that foundational aid structures persist across changing administrations and shifting political priorities. Making critical USAID  functions less vulnerable to partisan swings and volatile election cycles would preserve the
continuity in U.S. engagement and protect civilians around the world who depend on these
programs and maintain soft-power dynamics in strategically contested regions.

Recommendation #2
The vacuum left behind in Myanmar demonstrates the risks associated with abrupt withdrawals
from politically unstable regions. The United States should establish a policy of maintaining a
baseline humanitarian and diplomatic presence in politically unstable regions, even during
periods of domestic political transition. In the vacuum left behind in Myanmar, China quickly
consolidated its influence through humanitarian assistance, infrastructure investment, and
governance programs, effectively replacing USAID’s core functions. This shift illustrates that
USAID wasn’t solely an aid agency, but a vehicle for relationships, visibility, and trust that are
central to soft power. Withdrawing it doesn’t just reduce aid but eliminates U.S. presence
altogether and cedes strategic ground. Maintaining baseline engagement for high-risk regions
regardless of administration priorities would ensure that the United States retains influence and
credibility in strategically contested areas before, not after, a vacuum forms.

Recommendation #3
The broader implication of this drastic shift extends beyond Myanmar. The dismantling of
USAID signals a retreat from the tools that enabled the United States to exert influence without
coercion and to maintain credibility as a benevolent power. In response, the United States must
actively compete with China in soft power domains, including humanitarian assistance,
education, and civil society partnerships. In practice, this means restoring funding to U.S.-backed
independent media programs, expanding educational opportunities like university partnerships,
and supporting civil society organizations in politically unstable regions. Without sustained
engagement in these areas, the U.S. risks ceding long-term influence in strategically important
regions such as Southeast Asia.

These recommendations aim to restore U.S. credibility and rebuild soft power in a region as
strategically critical as Southeast Asia. Maintaining a sustained presence is essential to
preserving influence. The decision to retract USAID has already diminished U.S. influence,
creating space for its greatest competitor, China, to expand its role.

Moon Race: Recommendations for a New Era of Space Exploration
Bottom Line: 

• Great power competition extends to space exploration in the form of competing space initiatives: the Artemis Accords and the International Lunar Research Station.
• Most states pick a side, but the two exceptions—Thailand and Senegal—have a history of hedging their relations with the U.S. and China.
• International space initiatives should remain international; states shouldn’t be forced to choose one side or the other, or appease both, to build space exploration norms.

Background: International space law is comprised of four founding documents, which haven’t been updated since 1974. These documents don’t account for new conflicts and developments in space exploration, such as the concern over lunar resource commercialization and international space initiatives.

The Artemis Accords (Accords) and the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) are non-binding principles of space conduct open to all states. The Accords are U.S. sponsored and a prerequisite for joining the Artemis Project. The ILRS are China sponsored and requires all signees to participate in joint space activities.

Most states have sided with one or the other, with a noticeable pattern of authoritarian countries preferring the ILRS over the Accords. However, there are two exceptions: Thailand and Senegal signed with both. A survey of past historical behavior points to Thailand and Senegal’s pattern of hedging relations as a possible explanation. It’s likely that other states may follow their example as space exploration becomes more feasible.

However, it’s imperative that international collaboration on lunar exploration remain international. Current and future space actors must have an open path to space exploration, and the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs should help facilitate this goal.

Recommendations:
1) Revise the “International Cooperation for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space”
• The current version has not been updated since the 1970s and must be broadened to encompass the modern and future contexts of space industry development.
•One way is to create provisions that address new conflicts, such as the legality of lunar resource commercialization. Another way is to clarify or update vague terms and provisions, such as a detailed understanding what “national appropriation” of celestial bodies entails. International space law must be forward-looking to accommodate future space context, with enough flexibility to litigate novel scenarios, while remaining a structured, legal document.

2) Space Initiative Registration System
In the meantime, the UN should keep track of activities that new space initiatives conduct. Using the Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space, the UNOOSA should create a register of planned space activities. Just like the existing register, states will report pertinent information to the Secretary-General. This facilitates more communication between initiatives and provides information to address potential legal or technological conflicts, should they arise.
This database should be regularly updated and all provided information should be publicly available. This creates a strong system of accountability from the UN, the public, and fellow states. It also serves as a way to hold states responsible should disputes arise.